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ABSTRACT 
 
Recently in Shaw v Kovac, the Court of Appeal seemed to have rejected a standalone injury 
to autonomy (ITA) as actionable in negligence, in an informed consent case. In this article, I 
argue that Shaw can be explained away, and that English law recognizes ITA as actionable in 
a series of cases, some of which – Bhamra, Tracey and Yearworth – were not hitherto 
understood to do so. However, the under-theorization in the cases leads to inconsistencies. 
Like cases (Rees/Yearworth; Chester/Tracey) are not treated alike; ITA is misunderstood to 
be about ‘religious offence’ (Bhamra) and property loss (Yearworth) and worse still, the 
more serious type 2 ITA (Rees) gives rise to a weaker remedy (of exceptional nature aside) 
than the less serious type 1 injury (Chester). A better understanding of the different 
manifestations of ITA will lead to results which are both more consistent and more justified 
on the merit.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This article explores the protection of injury to autonomy (ITA) in English negligence law. 
As it happens, all but one of the main cases I shall discuss arose in two medical law contexts 
– informed consent and reproductive autonomy – so while the topic has broad ramifications 
to tort law and indeed private law, it is of special interest to health care lawyers. The article 
combines two major strands of my research interests: autonomy as actionable damage in 
negligence, contract and consumer protection;
1
 and tort responses to gendered harms.
2
 I make 
two main claims: first, (in Part II) that English negligence law does compensate ITA. I hope 
to demonstrate that the received wisdom viewing Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS 
Trust
3
 and perhaps Chester v Afshar
4
 as the only main cases remedying ITA
5
 is incorrect. 
Rather, three other appellate cases recognize ITA in the proper sense (defined below) as 
actionable: Tracey v Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust;
6
 Yearworth v 
                                                     
1
T. Keren-Paz, ‘Compensating Injury to Autonomy: A Conceptual and Normative Analysis’ in K 
Barker, K Fairweather and R Grantham (eds), Private Law in the 21st Century (Hart 2017) 411; 
‘Compensating Injury to Autonomy: Normative Evaluation, Recent Developments and Future 
Tendencies’ (2007) 22 Colman L Rev 187. 
2
 T. Keren-Paz, Sex Trafficking: A Private Law Response (Routledge 2013); Torts, Egalitarianism and 
Distributive Justice (Ashgate 2007); Leverhulme Fellowship RF-2016-358\8 ‘Privacy law, gender justice 
and end-users’ liability: “revenge porn” and beyond’. 
3
 [2003] UKHL 52. 
4
 [2004] UKHL 41. 
5
 Discussions in the literature focus on whether: this recognition of autonomy is justified, eg, T Clark 
and D Nolan, ‘A Critique of Chester v Afshar’ (2014) 34 OJLS 659; consistent with principles of tort 
law and the law of remedies, eg, Craig Purshouse, ‘Liability for Lost Autonomy in Negligence: 
Undermining the Coherence of Tort Law?’ (2015) 22 TLJ 226; D Nolan, ‘New Forms of Damage in 
Negligence’ (2007) 70 MLR 59; and whether the decisions are justified on merit eg, A Morris, 
‘Another Fine Mess: The Aftermath of McFarlane and the Decision in Rees v Darlington Memorial 
Hospital NHS Trust’ (2004) 20 PN 2; N Priaulx, The Harm Paradox: Tort Law and an Unwanted 
Child in an Era of Choice (Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 73–76. 
6
 [2014] EWCA Civ 822. 
3 
 
North Bristol NHS Trust;
7
 and Bhamra v Dubb.
8
 In particular, neither Bhamra nor Tracey 
were ever understood in the relevant literature for what they are – cases that view ITA as 
actionable in negligence. Accordingly, we can identify three categories of case in which ITA 
is actionable in England: breaches of informed consent in the medical context (Chester and 
Tracey), intervention in reproductive autonomy (Rees and Yearworth) and undermining 
ethical or religious food consumption choices (Bharma). In identifying the cases as involving 
ITA, I draw on a distinction, explained below, between three types of ITA, with some 
comparative lessons from Israel, a common tort law jurisdiction affording exceptionally 
robust protection of ITA. The claim that English law recognizes ITA is seemingly 
irredeemably undermined by the recent Court of Appeal’s decision in Shaw v Kovac.9 In Part 
III, I briefly explain why this is not the case. 
My second major claim (in Part IV) is that the relevant English jurisprudence is 
marred by a conceptual deficiency leading to an unsatisfying state of affairs of partial and 
inconsistent protection. Courts’ rhetoric about ‘autonomy’, and consequently the main bulk 
of the literature, gloss over the crucial distinction between the three types of ITA: Type 1, 
being deprived merely of the opportunity to consent to being moved from one state of affairs 
to another; Type 2, being moved without consent to a subjectively inferior state of affairs; 
and Type 3, autonomy loss consequent upon violation of a previously protected interest. This 
under-theorization leads to inconsistent levels of protection both across and within categories, 
and to an inverse hierarchy according to which more serious violations of ITA lead to lower 
damages awards and vice versa. Other authors, notably Nicky Priaulx,
10
 have drawn attention 
to some of these inconsistencies, but the analysis here does so more systematically and with 
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 [2009] EWCA Civ 37. 
8
 [2010] EWCA Civ 13. 
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 [2017] EWCA Civ 1028. 
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 N Priaulx, ‘Reproducing the Properties of Harms that Matter: The Normative Life of the Damage 
Concept in Negligence’ (2016) 5 JMLE 17. See also P Cane, ‘Another Failed Sterilisation’ (2004) 
120 LQR 89.  
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reference to an expanded dataset of relevant cases. Beyond conceptual under-theorization, 
there is another force at work contributing to the unsatisfactory level of protection, which is 
manifested mainly in reproductive torts cases: obliviousness to the nature of reproductive 
autonomy as a gendered harm. I leave the defending of this claim to another day. 
Before delving into the analysis, three related preliminary comments are in order: 
firstly, about the meaning of autonomy; secondly, the normative desirability of remedying 
ITA; and thirdly, the cogency of the descriptive claim advanced in this article. The starting 
point for my analysis is the understanding of personal autonomy as self-authorship. This 
account, most forcefully developed by Joseph Raz, (and others
11
), is both normatively 
attractive, and influential in case law
12
 and legal scholarship.
13
 According to Raz, ‘the ideal 
of autonomy is that people should make their own lives’ and the ‘autonomous person is a 
(part) author of his own life … the vision of people controlling, to some degree, their own 
destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions throughout their lives’.14 The standard, 
liberal account of autonomy, at least as applied to tort law, focuses on the ability to make 
choices simpliciter.
15
 However, it is debated whether the ideal of self-authorship can be 
invoked to trigger a private law remedy for any setback to one’s choices and desires. To use 
Diana Meyers’ terminology, it is unclear whether we ought to remedy violations of episodic 
autonomy, as opposed to programmatic autonomy.
16
 Arguably, Raz’s own conception of 
                                                     
11
 See, eg, R Lindley, Autonomy (Macmillan 1986). 
12
 Coleman v Attridge Law (A Firm) (C-303/06) [2008] All ER (EC) 1105 [9]; CA 10064/02 Migdal v 
Abu Hannah, PD 60(3) 13 (Supreme Court, ISr, 2005) [33]. 
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 Clark and Nolan (n5) 677; H Dagan, ‘Autonomy, Pluralism, and Contract Law Theory’ (2013) 76 
LCP 19. 
14
 J Raz, ‘Autonomy, Toleration, and the Harm Principle’ in S Mendus (ed), Justifying Toleration 
(CUP 1988) 155–56.  
15
 See, eg, P Cane, The Anatomy of Tort Law (Hart Publishing 1997) 234. cf M Dan-Cohen, Harmful 
Thoughts (Princeton University Press 2002) 125.  
16
 D Meyers, ‘Personal Autonomy and the Paradox of Feminine Socialization’ (1987) 84 JPhil 619, 
624–25. A person is programmatically autonomous when she is carrying out a life plan (how do I 
want to live my life?) that embodies her own answers to a particular type of question (what kind of 
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autonomy as self-authorship could be understood as programmatic rather than episodic 
(choice-centred). Remedying ITAs that undermine deeply held values – in which the choices 
undermined are positioned on the continuum somewhere between episodic autonomy, 
reflecting ‘thoughtless desire’,17 and programmatic autonomy – protects the core of self-
governance,
18
 so that ‘people can freely make up their own minds about what to believe and 
how to live, and can then act accordingly’.19 Similarly, if the effects of the thwarted choice 
are significant or lasting, they are more likely to affect programmatic, rather than episodic, 
autonomy.  
The liberal notion of autonomy has been criticized from communitarian, feminist and 
critical quarters as ontologically and normatively deficient;
20
 alternative understandings of 
‘relational’ and ‘embodied’ autonomy have thus been offered.21 At first glance, such a 
critique might query the desirability of remedying ITA in negligence, and raises the question 
of the threshold for injuries that ought to be compensated. I have recently normatively 
defended remedying ITA in negligence and would not repeat the argument here.
22
 Here I 
would make four points. First, even in feminist and critical quarters, the implications of the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
work do I want to do; do I want children? etc). In contrast, episodic autonomy entails being able to 
ask ‘what do I really want to do now?’ in a given situation. 
17
 See H Frankfurt, ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’ (1971) 68 JPhil 5. 
18
 See V Chico, Genomic Negligence (Routledge 2011) 66, based on the influential accounts of Gerald 
Dworkin and Harry Frankfurt. 
19
 A Voorhoeve, ‘The Limits of Autonomy’ (2009) 46 The Philosophers’ Magazine 78. 
20
 See eg, Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (2nd
 
edn, University of Notre 
Dame Press 1984) 30, 205; Sarah Hoagland, Lesbian Ethics: Toward New Value (Institute of Lesbian 
Studies 1988) 144; Louis Althusser, Essays in Self-Criticism (Grahame Lock tr, New Left Books 
1976), 205; Tom O’Shea, ‘Critics of Autonomy’, Essex Autonomy Project (2012) available at 
https://autonomy.essex.ac.uk/resources/critics-of-autonomy/.   
21
 J Christman, ‘Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism, and the Social Constitution of Selves’ 
(2004) 117 Phil Studies, 143; M Oshana Personal Autonomy in Society (Ashgate Publishing 2006); S 
Cowan, ‘Choosing Freely: Theoretically Reframing the Concept of Consent’ in R Hunter and S 
Cowan Choice and Consent: Feminist Engagements with Law and Subjectivity (Routledge 2007) 91.  
22
 Keren-Paz, ‘Conceptual Analysis’ (n1).  
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critique of the liberal conception of autonomy for consent and choice are unclear.
23
 In 
particular, the notion of embodied autonomy developed mainly in the critique of rape law
24
 
seems to be quite apt in wrongful conception cases, which are a major category of 
reproductive autonomy cases (and arguably, albeit less so, also to ethically motivated diet). 
Put differently, whether one adopts a classic, thin, liberal conception of choice, a thicker one 
(which I support) protecting significant choices, or relational or embodied concepts of 
autonomy, the pattern of decisions analysed below remains inconsistent and hard to justify. 
Second, the thicker notion of autonomy I adopt – protecting choices that are informed by 
one’s personal beliefs, ethics, values, attitudes and world view, or which have a significant 
bearing on the way one leads one’s life –  is immune to much of the critique uttered against 
the narrow liberal conception and is likely to assuage fears from the negative practical and 
expressive ramifications of compensating individuals in negligence for thwarted choices. 
Third, especially since courts’ liberal commitment is with us to stay, we should develop the 
jurisprudence in a way that is not androcentric and discriminatory. Finally, even on its own 
terms of a liberal, thin conception of choice, the pattern of decisions does not make sense 
(although the decision to view ITA as actionable negligence does); hence the focus in Part IV 
on the internal inconsistency of the decisions. 
A few words are in order about the cogency of the descriptive claim made here and its 
intellectual underpinning. The following questions should be distinguished: Whether a legal 
system a) ought to protect ITAs 1 and 2 (ITA 3 is protected as a matter of course and is 
uncontroversial); b) does so c) is self-aware that it does so; and d) does so consistently. In 
Israel, for example, the recognition of ITA is self-aware,
25
 yet inconsistent.
26
 I argue here that 
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 R Hunter and S Cowan ‘Introduction’ in Hunter and Cowan (n21) 2–3; Jennifer Nedelsky, 
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the recognition in England both lacks self-awareness— namely that a ‘best light’ reading of 
certain appellate cases is that they are concerned with protecting ITA 1 and 2, even if this is 
not always accompanied by the correct rhetoric and even if this is obscured by using other 
heads of damages -  and consistency. Intellectually, the exercise conducted here is influenced 
by rational reconstructivism; similar to Dworkin, I attempt to present in Part II the decisions 
implicating autonomy interests in their best light.
27
 So for example, while I am clear, as a 
matter of prediction, that Davies LJ (writing the main opinion in Shaw v Kovac) would reject 
ITA 1 and 2 as actionable in an appropriate case, I insist that Shaw’s ratio leaves open this 
possibility, and that read as a whole, the five cases discussed are best interpreted as 
remedying ITA 1 and 2.  
At the same time, normatively, I am loath to prioritize unbridled commitment to 
coherence and consistency over attainment of substantive justice.
28
 Descriptively, I find much 
cogency in Critical Legal Studies’ (CLS) critique of the possibility of legal determinacy, 
including of Dworkinian efforts to the rescue.
29
 But even if CLSers are correct that we can 
never achieve a totally coherent body of judicial decisions (and as Part IV demonstrates, 
English law is incoherent at the moment), this does not mean that rational reconstruction is 
impossible or futile. Indeed, the Part II claim that the five appellate cases are best understood 
as judicial attempts to remedy ITA types 1 or 2 is consistent with the Part IV claim that this is 
done inconsistently, and could be done better. 
The descriptive thesis I advance is faithful to the institutional limitations of 
adjudication in a common law system,
30
 and also, to Dworkin’s requirement (additional to his 
                                                     
27
 Ronald Dowrkin, Law’s Empire (London: Fontana 1986) 53. 
28
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29 Duncan Kennedy, ‘Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication’ (1976) 89 Harv LR  1685; 
and ‘The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies’, in Brown and Halley, eds., Left Legalism/Left 
Critique (Duke University Press 2002). 
30
 Hanoch Dagan, ‘The Realist Conception of Law’ (2007) 57 U. Toronto L.J. 607. 
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‘best light’ justification) that the theory would fit the practice.31 Central to this is an 
evolutionary understanding of norms, in the sense that some solutions, which are ideally 
preferable, are ruled out due to path dependence (precedence, or Dworkin’s chain novel 
metaphor
32
 in the legal field, and contingency in the biological field
33
). As is demonstrated 
below, even when the remedy was shoehorned into existing heads of damages, as was 
controversially done in Chester and Yearworth, the underlying concern was,
34
 or at least is 
better understood as, protecting meaningful choice, rather than bodily integrity or property. 
Moreover, the failure to theorize ITA 1 and 2 as actionable—an available option for 
evolutionary development—and to properly distinguish between them, led to results which 
are both inconsistent and unjust.  
 
II. RECOGNITION OF ITA IN THE FIVE CASES 
My analytical framework uses the tripartite ITA typology, types 1, 2 and 3, as described in 
the Introduction.
35
 An example of type 1 ITA is Chester, in which the claimant conceded she 
would have undergone the procedure after further consultation if she had been warned of the 
risk.
36
 An example of type 2 ITA is Rees, since the claimant preferred having no child over 
having one. An example of type 3 ITA would be a patient losing her eyesight as a result of a 
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 (n27) 52. 
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 Id. 229. 
33
 See Stephen J Gould, Wonderful Life (Norton: NY, 1989) Ch 5. By contingency Gould refers to a 
process by which historical outcomes arise from an unpredictable sequence of antecedent states, 
where any change in the sequence alters the final result. 
34
 This conclusion is based on careful reading of the judges’ own reasoning (see eg., text to nn 51, 57-
59) rather than on my own interpretive liberties.  
35
 For further discussion of the categories and borderlines see Keren-Paz, ‘Conceptual Analysis’  (n1) 
413–21. 
36
 (n4) [7]. 
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procedure to which she gave informed consent, but which was conducted negligently. Such 
patient suffers an autonomy loss consequent on the personal injury: loss of vision.
37
  
The tort of negligence requires actionable damage as a condition for liability and does 
not compensate for mere distress, inconvenience or discomfort that does not result in bodily 
or psychiatric illness.
38
 Seemingly, types 1 and 2 ITAs are mere distress and therefore not 
actionable in negligence
39
, but elsewhere I have argued that ITA is distinguishable from mere 
distress and ought to be compensated.
40
 I will turn now to show that English law already 
recognizes ITA as actionable, albeit inconsistently.
41
 I shall focus my attention on the 
following five cases: Rees, Yearworth, Chester, Tracey and Bhamra.  
 
A. Reproductive Autonomy 
                                                     
37
 In the paradigm informed consent case of Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board (Scotland) 
[2015] UKSC 11, in which the claimant sustains physical injury as a result of an operation to which 
she did not give her informed consent, the claimant was deprived of a meaningful choice (type 2 
injury, since if properly warned she would have chosen an alternative course of action) and suffered a 
type 3 injury consequent on the physical injury. While theoretically ITA 2 and 3 could accumulate, a 
reasonable policy decision could be that ITA 2 is ‘swallowed’ by ITA 3 damages. 
38
 Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] AC 655, 707–8 (per Lord Hoffman). See Nolan (n5).  
39
 By definition, type 3 is protected by a hitherto recognized interest. Type 2 shares with type 1 the 
feature of being a stand-alone injury (eg., consuming food ‘avoided’ for ethical or religious beliefs), 
so is different from ordinary type 3 harms. While for type 3 ITA, ‘autonomy’ serves as an underlying 
value, for types 2 and 1 it serves as a stand-alone protected interest. Cf Lord Hoffman’s similar 
distinction pertaining to ‘privacy’ in Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53 [31] and Joel 
Feinberg’s discussion of the relationship between harm interests and autonomy in The Moral Limits of 
the Criminal Law: Harm to Others (OUP, 1987).  
40
 Keren-Paz, ‘Conceptual Analysis’ (n1) 435–37.  
41
 Several English cases have recognized actionable damage not falling within what is permitted 
according to orthodoxy. Such is the damage from being falsely imprisoned, despite the fact that it 
does not involve physical, property or, at times, economic loss. W v Home Office
 
[1997] Imm AR 302; 
Nolan (n5) 64–67 (discussing other cases). On one interpretation, the damage from being sexually 
assaulted is actionable in negligence without a traditional consequential physical injury. See Maga v 
Archbishop of Birmingham [2010] 1 WLR 1441, rev in part [2009] EWHC 780 (QB). Maga revolved 
around the question of whether there was vicarious liability for the abuse and for the negligent failure 
by the priest in charge to follow up previous allegations of abuse against the abuser. Jack J dealt with 
the issue of damages without heed to the question of whether all items are equally actionable under 
battery and negligence. The case, therefore, serves as a weak indication that: (1) damages for sexual 
assault would often be the same whether claimed under battery or negligence; and (2) being sexually 
abused is itself an actionable damage in negligence.  
10 
 
1. Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust  
In Rees
42
 the claimant wished not to have children (mainly due to the fact that she had a 
genetic condition that rendered her practically blind). She underwent a sterilization operation, 
which was conducted negligently, so unbeknown to her had failed. She eventually became 
pregnant and gave birth to a son. The House of Lords awarded £15,000 as a conventional 
award to compensate the claimant for her loss of reproductive autonomy not to become a 
parent. This amount was over and above the mother’s right (settled in earlier case law) to 
damages for her physical injury due to the involuntary pregnancy and the consequent income 
loss.
43
 The negligent imprisonment cases
44
 as well as the conventional award in Rees for 
negligent interference with reproductive autonomy reveal that a loss of autonomy – at least 
when the interest in autonomy is capable of being translated into a narrow, recognized 
interest
45
 – are actionable damages. 
The award in Rees is for a type 2 injury – by definition Rees preferred ‘no child’ over 
‘having a child’; after all, that was the purpose of the procedure she undertook. Therefore, 
she found herself in a subjectively inferior state of affairs due to the defendant’s negligence. 
There are two peculiar aspects of the decision. First and foremost, the House of Lords 
deviated from the principle of full compensation – the well-entrenched individual assessment 
of damages – for a flat amount. All claimants whose reproductive autonomy has been 
undermined should receive the same amount. The decision is also conspicuous for the paltry 
                                                     
42
 (n3). 
43
 Rees (n3) at [8] (Lord Bingham); [17] (Lord Nicholls). In Greenfield v Irwin [2001] 1 WLR 1279 
the Court of Appeal applied McFarlane v Tayside Health Board Appellants [2000] 2 AC 59 to rule 
that loss of the mother’s earning capacity resulting from the mother reducing her participation in the 
paid labour market due to the birth of the unwanted child is not compensable. This point was left 
undecided by the McFarlane majority (Lord Slynn at [74], [84]; Lord Hope at [89]; contra Lord 
Clyde at [104], [106]). To be consistent with this holding, after Greenfield, only lost income which is 
consequential on the birth (or pregnancy) rather than on having a child could be compensated; cf 
Baxton and May LJJ in Greenfield at [29], [42].   
44
 (n41).  
45
 Nolan (n5), 64, 78–80. 
11 
 
amount given as compensation (or vindication). I will elaborate on these issues in Part IV 
below.  
 
2. Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust 
Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust
46
 is another example of remedying a type 2 injury; 
similar to Rees, the context is reproductive autonomy, but here the protection is more 
tortuous. Damages for mental distress were held to be available (subject to proof of factual 
causation) as a consequence of learning that the claimants’ sperm had been negligently 
destroyed by the defendant, which had undertaken to look after the claimants’ sperm with all 
possible care. The court based this conclusion on two factors: (1) characterizing the 
relationship between the claimants and defendant as gratuitous bailment;
47
 and (2) the 
applicability to bailment of contractual damages for mental distress in cases where an object 
of the contract was to provide peace of mind.
48
  
Much about the way Yearworth was argued and litigated could have led to its 
classification as a type 3 injury; however, type 2 is the more accurate classification. In ITA 2, 
the undermining of one’s autonomy itself (in the sense of being moved without consent to a 
subjectively inferior state of affairs) is the actionable damage, rather than autonomy being 
protected indirectly by compensating a recognized protected interest such as property or 
bodily integrity. As long as one focuses on the characterization of the sperm as property, one 
could see the damages for psychiatric injury, but also even the claim for distress, as damages 
for consequential loss flowing from interference with the claimants’ property rights. But the 
                                                     
46
 (n7). 
47
 While the claimants’ right to damages was ultimately ingrained in bailment, most of the court’s 
analysis was done within a tort framework, including a reference for the open question of whether 
psychiatric injury consequent on negligent destruction of property is compensable; Yearworth (n7) 
[55]. For this reason, I include Yearworth in this section, dealing with protection of autonomy through 
the tort of negligence.  
48
 ibid [49], [56]–[58]. 
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nub of the claimants’ complaint was not about the destruction of property, commonly 
understood.
49
 The nub of the litigation was the lost chance to become a father (and the fear 
resulting from that loss, even if the claimant subsequently regained fertility), which is clearly 
a type 2 injury related to one’s reproductive autonomy.50  Indeed, the court itself understood 
the claim in this way, by noting that the purpose of the arrangement was ‘the provision to the 
men of non-pecuniary personal or family benefits. Any award of damages should reflect the 
realities behind these arrangements and their intended purpose’.51  
 
B. Informed Consent 
1. Chester v Afshar 
A somewhat hidden liberalization of actionable damage is evident from Chester v Afshar,
52
 at 
least if one accepts, as I do, that the decision cannot be explained based on traditional factual 
and legal causation principles. Afshar negligently failed to warn Chester of a small inherent 
risk in the procedure she undertook and the risk materialized. There was no negligence in the 
way the procedure was undertaken and, had Chester been warned, she would have delayed 
                                                     
49
 Indeed, the proposition (which I support) that the claimants have property in the sperm is novel and 
controversial, and the failed attempt to classify the destruction of the sperm as personal injury only 
goes to prove the point. 
50
 Had the Trust negligently failed to inform the claimants about the risk of infertility, or to offer 
storage of the sperm, there would have been no issue of ownership. The issue then might have been 
framed as one of personal injury: the inability to father a child, a consequence of the treatment, would 
have been avoided had there not been a breach of duty. Still, the real issue was the interference with 
the choice of becoming a father. The complaint in such a case is not that the treatment itself 
eliminated the claimant’s fertility. Rather, it is that the defendant did not take reasonable care to 
preserve the claimant’s ability to procreate, notwithstanding the non-wrongful, medical consequence 
of the treatment – the reduced fertility itself. This is a complaint about undermining the claimant’s 
reproductive autonomy, which is a type 2 injury.  
51
 ibid [57] (my emphasis). The care the court took to analyse the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 also supports this conclusion. But for current purposes, not much hangs on 
accepting as correct my claim that the court itself viewed the claim in Yearworth as based on ITA 2. 
What matters is that the case ought to be understood as protecting reproductive autonomy, and hence 
be condemned for the ensuing inconsistencies with Rees.  
52
 (n4). 
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her consent but eventually would have undergone the procedure.
53
 I happen to belong to the 
minority believing that the breach in Chester was not even the factual cause of the injury.
54
 In 
any event, it is conceded by almost all
55
 that the failure to inform Chester of the risk did not 
increase the chance that the injury would materialize.
56
 Fully compensating Chester for the 
consequent physical injury is a way to vindicate the claimant’s interest in autonomy. 
Damages are given for depriving Chester of the option to agree to the procedure after being 
fully informed – the right to ‘make an informed choice’, to ‘be informed’ or ‘know’.57 
Absence of remedy ‘would render the duty useless’ and ‘hollow’.58 For this reason, I view 
Chester as a case whose purpose is to compensate for ITA simpliciter (a type 1 case), rather 
than a case aiming to remedy a negligent infliction of personal injury with the collateral 
effect of protecting autonomy (a type 3 case). It follows that in Chester, while the measure of 
recovery is the physical injury, its raison d’être is the breach of the patient’s autonomy, not 
traditional notions of responsibility based on decisional causation between the breach and the 
physical injury.
59
 
                                                     
53
 ibid [7]. 
54
 If the inherent risk in the procedure is tied up with the decision to undergo the procedure (ie with 
the claimant) rather than with the date when the procedure took place (as the majority believed), there 
is not even a factual causation between the breach of duty and the physical injury. This was Lord 
Bingham’s view, in dissent at [8]. 
55
 A notable exception is J Stapleton, ‘Occam’s Razor Reveals an Orthodox Basis for Chester v 
Afshar’ (2006) 122 LQR 426. Critics include Clark and Nolan (n5) 670–73; R Stevens, Torts and 
Rights (OUP 2007) 52–53; C Miller, ‘Negligent Failure to Warn: Why is it so Difficult?’ (2012) 28 
PN 266, 271–72; D Hamer, ‘“Factual Causation” and “Scope of Liability”: What’s the Difference?’ 
(2014) 77 MLR 155, 182–87; T Keren-Paz, ‘Liability for Consequences, Duty of Care and the 
Limited Relevance of Specific Reliance: New Insights on Bhamra v Dubb’ (2016) 32 PN 48, 61–62. 
56
 Chester (n4) [18] (Lord Steyn); [31] (Lord Hoffman dissenting); [55]–[56], [81] (Lord Hope); [98] 
(Lord Walker); Clark and Nolan (n5) 666–67. 
57
 Chester (n4) [86] (Lord Walker); [16] (Lord Steyn); [22] (Lord Steyn); [55] (Lord Hope). 
58
 ibid [87] (Lord Hope); cf Lords Steyn at [24] and Walker at [101]. 
59
 cf J Murphy and C Witting, Street on Torts (13th edn, OUP 2013) 159. For further support of the 
view that the real damage in Chester is the interference in her autonomy, see the sources mentioned in 
Purshouse (n5) 231. Purshouse himself argues that autonomy should not be protected in negligence. 
Jenny Steele has rightly commented on Chester that it ‘is poised awkwardly between the torts of 
battery and negligence, because the wrong is denial of self determination, rather than exposure to risk; 
14 
 
 Once the relevant interest (autonomy, as distinct from freedom from physical injury) 
has been identified properly, one can debate what the appropriate response is.
60
 Of 
importance is the fact that Chester, properly understood, is the highest authority for 
interference with the claimant’s autonomy (rather than causing physical injury) as actionable 
damage in negligence.  
 
2. Tracey v Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 
Still in the medical context, the Court of Appeal in Tracey seems to have assumed that a 
patient denied information and a right to seek a second opinion on a Do Not Attempt 
Resuscitation (DNAR) decision made by the medical staff had a common law cause of action 
(and not only an Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) right based 
on the private nature of end-of-life decisions) against the defendant.
61
 Given the following 
three facts, the obiter in Tracey seems to support the actionability of ITA in negligence: (1) 
the engagement of Article 8’s right to private life in Tracey is undisputedly based on 
autonomy
62
 (which also featured heavily in the opinions in Tracey
63
); (2) Longmore LJ 
seemed to have in mind the tort of negligence when he mentioned the availability of a 
                                                                                                                                                                     
but the harm is personal injury “by accident”’. J Steele, Tort Law, Text Cases and Materials (OUP 
2007) 63. Subjecting someone to treatment without her consent is an affront to autonomy and dignity 
– values that were traditionally protected by battery.   
60
 The options are: no protection at all (as Lord Hoffman held); a solatium for the type 1 ITA (as the 
Israeli Supreme Court held in Daaka (n25) and as supported by Clark and Nolan (n5) 688–89 who 
ultimately prefer a sui generis statutory cause of action (ibid 689–91)); a conventional award as in 
Rees; or full compensation for the physical injury as the majority of the House of Lords held in 
Chester. 
61
 (n6) [89] (per Longmore LJ), [94] (per Ryder LJ). 
62
 See R (on the application of Catt) (Respondent) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2015] 
UKSC 9 [4]. 
63
 (n6) [32], [39], [64]. 
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common law duty;
64
 and (3) on the facts of Tracey, had the duty not been breached, the 
decision not to resuscitate would have remained the same.
65
  
 This makes Tracey, if anything, a type 1 injury although the correct classification is 
somewhat tricky. If, typically, a patient would prefer to be resuscitated, seemingly the breach 
of duty moved the patient to an inferior state of affairs (from a chance of being resuscitated, 
had the duty not been breached, to a DNAR status). The complicating factor is that a patient 
does not have a right to receive treatment deemed futile, or not in the patient’s best interest.66 
Since Tracey was eventually returned to a DNAR status after being properly informed, the 
breach of duty merely deprived her of an important procedural right, but did not cause her to 
be moved to the inferior (DNAR) state of affairs. However, it is far from obvious that 
denying a claimant a right to be heard in circumstances where the hearing would not have 
changed the decision is a violation of one’s autonomy.67 
ITA as a stand-alone actionable damage (as distinct from protecting autonomy 
indirectly in type 3 ITA) exists only when the claimant is deprived of a real choice to which 
                                                     
64
 This could be discerned by the reference in Tracey (n6) at [89] to R (Burke) v GMC [2006] QB 273, 
[50]–[55], which in turn discusses the duty in the context of providing sufficient information to the 
patient. 
65
 Tracey (n6) [4]–[5] (the first notice was revoked when the patient’s daughter found out about the 
status but, following the process involving the patient and her family, a second notice was added to 
the patient’s file). 
66
 R (Burke) (n64). 
67
 Further complications exist where the patient is incapacitated and family members (in the example 
below, the mother) are not consulted in the DNAR decision, contrary to S 4(7) of the MCA 2005. See 
Winspear v City Hospitals Sunderland NHS Foundation Trust [2015] EWHC 3250. In that case, the 
court (Mr Justice Black) gave a declaration that the breach of s. 4(7) amounted to a procedural breach 
of the procedural duty under Art 8(2) ECHR protecting the patient’s right to private life. No damages 
were awarded. The decision (at [63]) that the mother cannot sue in her personal capacity raises 
interesting questions about whose autonomy is undermined in such cases, and the usefulness of 
relational autonomy in answering these questions. The decision (at [64]) that declaration is a 
sufficient remedy (but no damages to the mother in her personal representative capacity) reflects the 
doubts in the text, of whether a violation of a procedural right amounts to a deprivation of a 
significant choice. Two or three of the five factors mentioned in support of not awarding damages are 
likely endemic to such cases: the clinician’s good faith clinical judgment, that the notice had not 
impacted on the treatment (which makes it a type 1, rather than 3 ITA), and perhaps also the fact that 
the DNAR notice subsisted for only 9-10 hours. The two other factors were fact specific, so leave 
room to award damages in appropriate cases: that the decision was made before the clarification of the 
law in Tracey, and that consultation was always foreseen as part of the treatment plan.    
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he has the right,
68
 and which he is capable of exercising. In many of the cases in which a 
protected interest was undermined, no such choice existed. Think of a patient who gave his 
consent to treatment, but was injured due to clinical negligence. Such a patient suffers a 
setback to an important interest, and the physical injury entails a type 3 loss of autonomy. 
However, the breach of duty did not deprive him of any meaningful choice, so no remedy for 
ITA should exist.
69
 Similarly, a person receiving urgent treatment while unconscious cannot 
complain of ITA (unless, a valid advance directive refusing treatment is at place), since she 
was not capable of exercising any choice.
70
  
For this reason,
 
the Israeli Supreme Court erred in Avnaal v State of Israel
71
 in 
compensating a company
72
 for ITA in the following non-medical circumstances. The 
company was denied a hearing and was given a misleading reason for not having its import 
permit renewed. Crucially, the refusal to renew the permit was valid, and the decision would 
not have changed had a correct reasoning and a hearing been given. This result is mistaken 
since the company was not deprived of any meaningful choice, as it was subject to the 
administrative power to withhold the permit. If it was deprived of any protected interest, it 
was not an interest in its autonomy.
73
 
                                                     
68
 For special complications in the context of sexual autonomy, see Keren-Paz, ‘Conceptual Analysis’ 
(n1) note 61.  
69
 cf the discussion in the text to nn 36–37 in the paradigm breach of informed consent cases. 
70
 Absence of meaningful choice also explains why cases like Phelps v London Borough of Hillingdon 
[2001] 2 A.C. 619  do not involve type 2 ITA, despite being what Priaulx (n10) terms damage 
hybrids. These cases are essentially negligent diagnostic cases (such as Gregg v Scott
 
 [2005] 2 WLR 
268) in which the complaint is of harm suffered (psychological, economic, other) as a result of the 
delayed diagnosis (of having dyslexia, or similar conditions). In negligence diagnosis cases (unlike in 
Rees and Bhamra), it is hard to argue that the claimant lost a genuine or meaningful choice, at least as 
long as a dominant prognostic course of action exists. Rather, the claimant suffers harm (similar to 
run-of-the-mill personal injury cases) that undermines her autonomy. Moreover, even if a meaningful 
choice did exist (or is artificially constructed), the ITA is type 3 since it is also, and perhaps 
principally, manifested in a more traditional form of damage (psychological or economic).  
71
 CA 1081/00 Avnaal v State of Israel, Pad-or 2005(1) 85. For a critique, see Keren-Paz, ‘Normative 
Evaluation’ (n1) 210–13.  
72
 It is not evidently desirable to allow companies to sue for infringements of their autonomy.  
73
 Indeed, the holding (by majority) in Lumba v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] 
UKSC 12 is consistent with the critique of  Avnaal, offered in the text. In Lumba, claimants who were 
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To be clear, while I have doubts whether the remedy in Avnaal is warranted, I have no 
doubts that a remedy in Tracey is (although the justification might be ingrained in dignity or 
deterrence, not necessarily autonomy). The interest infringed in Tracey – the right to be 
informed of a decision affecting the claimant’s life expectancy (and quality of life) – is quite 
different from the commercial interest in Avnaal. Moreover, the knowledge about the DNAR 
status is important both in itself (telling of the severity of the claimant’s condition) and in 
preparation for the impending end of life, in a way that the knowledge about the true reason 
to deny the renewal of an import permission is not.  
 
C. Food Consumption: Bhamra v Dubb 
Whether ITA is actionable has been litigated elsewhere in the very different context of food 
consumption, mainly where due to the defendant’s negligence the claimant consumed food 
she would rather avoid on ethical or religious grounds.
74
 In England, the issue was raised in 
Bhamra v Dubb. Bhamra attended a Sikh wedding in a Sikh temple, at which food was 
served by the caterer Dubb, a Sikh himself. Observant Sikhs do not eat food containing eggs. 
Bhamra was aware that he had an egg allergy. Some of the ras malai that was served 
contained eggs, probably because the defendant purchased ras malai during the wedding 
from an outside source (the number of guests having exceeded expectation). Bhamra had an 
allergic reaction, was taken to hospital and eventually died. The trial court dismissed 
Bhamra’s widow’s personal injury claim, which was based on a breach of contract, but found 
in favour of her claim in negligence. On appeal, only the negligence claim was litigated, so 
                                                                                                                                                                     
falsely imprisoned based on unlawful policy recovered only nominal damages, since they could have 
been detained lawfully according to the published policy. For a different view, see A Twerski and N 
Cohen, ‘Informed Decision Making and The Law of Torts: The Myth of Justiciable Causation’ (1988) 
U Ill L Rev 607 (making an analogy between ITA and the remedy for violation of the constitutional 
right to due process); cf CA 1303/09 Kadosh v Bikur Holim Hospital (Supreme Court, Israel, 
5.3.2012) [43] (Rivlin J). 
74
 See articles in n1 and text to nn 88–91 for discussion of relevant cases.  
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the court felt a discussion of the correctness of the dismissal of the contractual claim was 
unnecessary. Liability in negligence was affirmed.
75
 
Stripped to its essence, the court’s analysis seems to make two propositions. The first 
is that the defendant owed Bhamra a duty of care not to offend his religious beliefs by 
negligently serving food containing eggs, despite the fact ‘that a restaurateur or caterer who is 
providing food for people who, as far as he is aware, are of no more than ordinary 
susceptibility does not owe them a duty to take reasonable care to prevent their suffering 
harm through eating egg’.76 This is so since ‘it was important to avoid the use of eggs for 
purely religious reasons’.77 ‘In those circumstances he was certainly under a duty to take 
reasonable care not to serve dishes containing egg in order to avoid offending against Sikh 
religious principles’.78 The court’s second proposition is that this duty could be extended 
under the circumstances to avoid Bhamra’s personal injury resulting from his egg allergy.79 
For current purposes, the first proposition is of importance. While Bhamra sued only for the 
personal injury,
80
 the court’s proposition, if correct, should allow all observing guests 
(including, potentially, the deceased
81
) to receive compensation for the religious offence 
suffered from consuming ‘avoided’ food.  
 While I support this proposition, it needs one correction and one clarification. The 
correction is that the injury should be conceived as ITA (type 2), not as religious offence per 
se. What matters is that the three constitutive elements of ITA are met – meaningful choice, 
                                                     
75
 Bhamra (n8) [2], [10], [12], [25], [29]. 
76
 ibid [19]. 
77
 ibid.  
78
 ibid [25].  
79
 ibid. 
80
 Such a claim raises questions about the scope of liability for consequences, discussed in Keren-Paz 
(n55). 
81
 Bhamra consumed eggs which he wished to avoid on religious grounds and to which he was 
allergic. In principle, the claims are separated but the effect of death on the ITA claim (by the estate 
or a dependent) raises complications which will only be alluded to in Part III below.  
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reliance interest and irreversible harm
82
 – and that the interference undermined both the 
guests’ control over their bodies (what to eat) and their freedom of conscience. These 
manifestations of autonomy are at its core, so even though (or even if) only the undermining 
of programmatic autonomy, or of deeply held values should be remedied,
83
 Bhamra clearly 
merits remedy. In terms of the constitutive elements: the guests were deprived of a 
meaningful choice whether to consume eggs (contrary to their religious belief); this 
undermined their reliance interest since the post-intervention state of affairs – having 
consumed eggs – is inferior to the pre-intervention state of affairs (of not having consumed 
eggs); the injury is irreversible since they were not just put at risk of consuming them, but 
actually consumed them. In contrast to ITA, ‘religious offence’ is a contested protected 
interest. On the one hand, it is hard to distinguish it from distress, which is not a protected 
interested in the law of negligence.
84
 On the other hand, religious offence might be used to 
undermine third parties’ autonomy (eg calls not to publish caricatures that offend devout 
Muslims). Overlooking autonomy as a distinct and worthy protected interest, and presumably 
mischaracterizing it as a case of distress, led Janet O’Sullivan (mistakenly, in my view) to 
describe the court’s proposition as ‘preposterous’.85  
 While I support the court’s proposition, it is in my opinion an obiter. First, if it were 
part of the holding in Bhamra, any other observant guest should have received an award for 
this injury. After all, the breach and causation issues that were established for the physical 
injury are equally established for the ITA. This was not litigated, since Ms Bhamra, quite 
understandably, did not seek such compensation. The proposition is an obiter for another 
                                                     
82
 See Keren-Paz, ‘Conceptual Analysis’ (n1) 421–25.  
83
 ibid 426–27. 
84
 See n38. 
85
 J O’Sullivan, ‘From Snail to Egg: Duty of Care, Fault and Food Allergies’ (2010) 69 CLJ 435, 437. 
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reason: as I explain elsewhere,
86
 there was no need to base the duty of care to Bhamra with 
respect to his physical injury on the duty not to offend religious feelings.
87
 
From a comparative perspective, Bhamra-like cases are litigated quite successfully, 
and in considerable volume in Isreal, albeit as consumer class actions (whose basis is a 
statutory tort, not negligence). A recent successful certification is Barzilaay v Prinir Ltd, 
88
 
which comes as close as possible to Bhamra. Primir sold products as ‘Kosher for Passover’, 
despite a known concern raised by regional rabbinical authority that the products might not 
be kosher for Passover. Claimants who consumed the product before discovering the doubts 
about the product’s Kosher credentials could sue for ITA and for the price paid. Claimants 
who bought the food but discovered the doubt before consuming it could sue only for the 
price but not for ITA. 
In fact, Israeli courts went further by suggesting in the seminal Tnuva litigation that 
even ITA type 1 is actionable by consumers,
89
 although ultimately, only a type 2 was 
compensated for.
90
 Tnuva, the leading Israeli milk distributor, added silicone to its long-life 
milk in order to avoid frothing, without disclosing this on the product’s label (and later on, 
falsely denied in an advertisement that silicone was added) despite being aware that silicone 
is a prohibited chemical. Tnuva 1 certified the claim for purposes of class action; Tnuva 2  
imposed liability for the misrepresentation.
91
  
The duty to respect ethical or religious choices recognized in Bhamra could apply to 
medical contexts. A type 2 injury would involve a vegan patient submitting to a test 
                                                     
86
 Keren-Paz (n55). 
87
  What matters is that Bhamra had good reason to rely on the (implicit) misrepresentation that no 
eggs would be served, and was injured as a result. If a non-observant guest with a known egg allergy 
had attended the wedding, relying on eggs not being served, he would have been owed a duty too.  
88
  CA 8037/06 Barzilaay v Prinir Ltd (Supreme Court, Israel, 4.9.2014). 
89
 CA 10085/08 Tnuva v Raabi (no 2) (Supreme Court, 4.12.2011) (‘Tnuva 2’) [33]–[40]; CA 1338/97 
Tnuva v Raabi (no 1), PD 57(4) 673 (Supreme Court, 2003) (‘Tnuva 1’) 681–84.   
90
 Tnuva 2 ibid [43]. 
91
 (n89). 
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containing animal products contrary to reassurances that it does not.
92
 In addition to refusal to 
receive treatment on religious or ethical grounds (think of Jehovah's Witnesses
93
), protecting 
ITA 2 in a medical context could arise in non-clinical contexts. In Ahsan v University 
Hospitals Leicester NHS Trust,
94
 the decision to allow the more expensive home care costs 
(of an incapacitated claimant) was based on the non-clinical spiritual preferences of the 
family members (and presumably the patient), mainly the advantage of the patient being 
present while her family members pray for her, and avoiding the risk (which materialised in 
an institutional care setting) that intimate care would be given by men.
95
  Ahsan involves few 
complications which I will not address here – including the relevance of incapacity, the 
difference between negative and positive religious fiats, and the accommodation of religious 
preferences which might be deemed controversial. It is also noteworthy that the choice 
involved (whether it was the patient’s hypothetical choice or the relatives’ actual choice) 
pertains to post-accident care and not to pre-accident precaution. The lesson from Ahsan 
remains that the appropriateness of the care is not determined solely based on clinical 
considerations but includes also broader social aspects, a familiar point in the MCA best 
interest jurisprudence.
96
 So a patient subjected, unbeknown to her, to a form of treatment 
which ought to be known as offending her religious or ethical beliefs – say the use of cream 
containing animal products where an alternative exists and the patient’s wishes are known, 
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 Cf Friedman v Merck & Co 107 Cal App 4th 454 (2003), where the claimant, a strict ethical vegan, 
was required, as a condition of the offered employment, to undergo a TB test. The claim against the 
distributors failed, despite that defendants negligently misrepresented, upon inquiry, that the test did 
not contain animal products and was ‘Vegan 'safe'  and ‘Vegan 'friendly.' Based on Bhamra, liability 
should inhere. 
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 Camden LBC v R (A Minor) (Blood Transfusion) FD 8 Jun 1993. As discussed in Keren-Paz,  
‘Conceptual Analysis’ (n1) 426, courts, by denying the patient’s capacity regarding a refusal to 
receive urgent medical care, employ a more objective test for autonomy than their rhetoric suggests.  
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 [2006] EWHC 2624 (QB). 
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 Id. [44, 48-9, 51] 
96
 However, Helen Taylor recently documented how in practice ‘best interests’ may be conflated with 
the clinician's evaluation of ‘best medical interests’ ‘What are 'Best Interests'? A Critical evaluation of 
'Best Interests' Decision-Making in Clinical Practice’ (2016) 24 Med. LR  176. 
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could lead according to Bhamra to liability, even though, clinically speaking, no harm was 
done.
97
 
 
D. Conclusion on the legal recognition of ITA 
English negligence law does protect ITA types 1 and 2. The most explicit recognition was in 
Rees, where the negligent interference with reproductive autonomy – type 2 ITA – led to a 
£15,000 conventional award. Less explicitly, Yearworth also protects reproductive autonomy. 
While the ‘peg’ for the award of damages was the distress (or the psychiatric injury) 
stemming from the destruction of property, it is clear that the raison d’être of the award is 
protecting the claimants’ reproductive autonomy. The real injury was the loss of the option to 
become a father and the consequential distress, rather than the destruction of the sperm as 
property per se. Type 2 injury in the context of consuming food was recognized in obiter in 
Bhamra as giving rise to a duty of care (and implicitly as actionable damage). Type 1 ITA 
was recognized as actionable in Chester and in obiter in Tracey. As discussed, the better 
reading of Chester is that it is only the interference with the claimant’s autonomy that could 
justify the award of damages (for the personal injury) despite the fact that the breach did not 
increase the risk that the injury would occur, and as such did not satisfy the traditional legal 
causation test. The court’s reasoning is clearly based on the need to vindicate the claimant’s 
autonomy, despite the fact that her decision would not have changed had she been properly 
informed. In Tracey too, the breach of the obligation to inform the patient of her DNAR 
status gives rise to a remedy in negligence, despite the fact that the decision was not changed 
after the patient was informed. 
  
III. EXPLAINING AWAY SHAW V KOVAC 
                                                     
97
 Those uncomfortable with such a conclusion should reflect, that, technically speaking, such 
treatment is a battery, if the cream is applied by a nurse, and the consent deemed to be invalid. 
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Shaw is a recent Court of Appeal breach of informed consent decision in which a 
claim for a separate head of damages for ‘loss of personal autonomy’ was rejected. The court 
held, inter alia that ‘the appellant can derive no real assistance from the decisions 
in Chester or in Montgomery in order to justify the additional head of loss now being 
proposed’98 or ‘from legal principle either… the present claimed head of loss is contrary to 
principle’.99 While Shaw clearly represents an inimical (and misguided) approach to 
generally (or in the context of informed consent) compensating ITA2 in negligence, I argue 
that its ratio decidendi is limited to its facts which make the recognition of ITA indeed more 
contested: where type 3 damages are already available, and where a type 2 award is given 
post mortem and with the purpose and effect of circumventing the provisions of  S1 of the 
Administration of Justice Act 1982 which restricts the recovery of post mortem damages. The 
persuasive potential of the broader inimical approach to ITA as a new head of damages is 
limited, both because, as the court mentions, the point was not well or fully argued,
100
 and 
because the court did not consider at all Tracey (whose facts are most similar to Shaw), 
Bhamra, and Yearworth, misinterpreted the holding in, and relevance of Chester and Rees, 
and overly relied on Montgomery which has (indeed) limited relevance for gleaning a right to 
damages for ITA. 
The claimant’s father (aged 86) - the patient - received a treatment from which he 
died without receiving proper information about the risks involved. It was conceded that had 
the patient been given the relevant information he would have refused the operation. The 
Trail Judge (HHJ Platts) assessed damages at £15,591.83, including £5,500 for pain suffering 
and loss of amenity. The appeal was for allowing an additional £50,000 as loss for personal 
autonomy. On trial, the judge rejected the claim (which was not pleaded) that based on 
                                                     
98
 (n9) [66]. 
99
 ibid. [67]. 
100
 See ibid eg., [31], [33], [35], [47] (‘arguments…unfocused’), [48], [57], [71] (‘puzzlingly’).  
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Chester and Montgomery, a claim for loss of personal autonomy is neither for damages for 
personal injury nor for loss of expectation of life so was not precluded by S 1 of 
Administration of Justice Act 1982. On appeal the court (with the main speech by Davies LJ) 
found that a claim for loss of autonomy is not a distinct cause of action, that, based on 
Lumba,
101
 vindicatory damages are not available, that nominal damages are unavailable in a 
negligence claim and that compensatory damages cannot be supported by Chester and 
Montgomery. It further found that the right for personal autonomy  ‘has always been the 
foundation of and rationale for the existence of a duty of care on doctors to provide proper 
information’ so ‘the claimed additional award of compensatory damage as sought in the 
present case is in truth unnecessary and unjustified’.102 Moreover, there is no ‘principled 
approach’ to assess such damages and no justification for the award to ‘vary from one context 
to another’.103 Furthermore, substantial additional damages were sought to compensate for 
the five lost years whose recovery was disallowed by the 1982 Act;
104
 in addition, not 
recognizing ITA would not mean that the estate would be left without a remedy.
105
 Finally, 
Rees cannot support a conventional award in this case in which a remedy is already available 
(S1 of the 1982 Act) due to floodgates concerns if Rees is extended to the current case.
106
 
While the Shaw court might well doubt the general desirability of compensating ITA, 
the thrust of its reasoning, and I suggest, the ratio, is one of the following two propositions: 
(1) No award for ITA can be given in run of the mill breach of informed consent cases in 
which the patient who suffered personal injury would not have consented to the treatment had 
s/he been informed of the relevant risk. In such a case, while conceptually, ITA2 is separated 
from (and additional to) the physical injury (ITA3), policy considerations can support 
                                                     
101
 (n73).   
102
 (n9) [69]. 
103
 ibid [72]. See Part IV(A) below for a discussion. 
104
 ibid [73] 
105
 ibid [74] 
106
 ibid [81]-[82]. 
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limiting the claimant to the run of the mill personal injury claim.
107
 In most cases, the amount 
that should be awarded for ITA 2, would be negligible in comparison to what is awarded for 
the personal injury (with its entailed autonomy losses), so limiting claimants to type 3 injuries 
makes sense. In Israel, whether ITA2 can be awarded in addition to ITA3 personal injury 
damages is in dispute, but the dominant view seems to exclude them.
108
 It is true that the 
Shaw court thought it was ‘impossible … to see the justification for’ awarding damages ‘even 
if the operation performed on a patient was a complete success’ or ‘even if it were established 
that the patient still would have consented if he had been given the proper information’. 109 
But these points, apparently, were not well argued, the justifications for such awards were not 
discussed, and in any event, the court’s observation was obiter. The court did emphasize at 
several places the existence of remedy, and the fact that what was sought was an additional 
remedy (intended to bypass existing limitations besides) as the crucial element in rejecting 
the appeal.
110
  
(2) No ITA2 or 1 award can survive death, or at least, ought not be awarded if its 
purpose or effect is to circumvent the no compensation for lost years enshrined in the 1982 
Act. Note that this holding is more limited than (1). It leaves open the possibility to award 
ITA2 damages in cases in which the patient would have refused the treatment and suffered a 
personal injury (yet survived) for which s/he is being compensated. The strongest support for 
such interpretation of the holding in Shaw is the court’s observation that:   
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 See n37. 
108
 Authorities supporting accumulation include Daaka (n25) 589; CA 4576/08 Ben-Zvi v Hiss (7.7. 
2011, Supreme Court) [51], [55]; and Kadosh (n73) [45] (per Rivlin J). Opposing authorities, which I 
view as the current dominant view, include Tnuva 2 (n89) [40] (Hayut J); Prinir (n88) [39] (Melcer 
J); Kadosh ibid [74] (Amit J, individual opinion, who mentions that the court’s practice denies 
awarding both type 2 and type 3 damages); Hiss ibid [25] (Amit J, dissenting). 
109 (n8) [71]. 
110
 (n9) [65] [66], [69], [79], [81]. At [63] the court distinguishes Chester which it views as merely 
modifying orthodox principles of causation: ‘Those considerations do not apply here, where causation 
and loss were on any view made out and a right to damages in consequence also made out’. 
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I formed the very decided impression, reinforced by it being so stated in the second 
written ground of appeal, that substantial damages, now claimed in the amount of 
£50,000, were in reality being sought because Mr Ewan lost, as it was said, some five 
years of his life. But that could not be so articulated, just because of the provisions of 
s.1 of the 1982 Act. It is true that it was also sought somehow to be argued that the 
present claim was not an ‘action for damages for personal injuries’. But one only has 
to look at the Re-amended Particulars of Claim to see that this is precisely what it 
was. HHJ Platts was, in my view, obviously right to see it that way.
111
 
Note that there are two separate issues here, and each could plausibly support denial of 
compensating ITA2 in Shaw. First, it is unclear whether infringement of the right to 
autonomy survives death and whether it should be considered as patrimonial. This also 
relates to the question whether it should be evaluated according to a mixed subjective-
objective test revolving around the distress (or anger) that the breach caused the claimant, or 
a purely objective test viewing choice, or option, as having objective value irrespective of the 
claimant’s subjective feelings, or indeed even awareness that they were deprived of a choice. 
These are important issues, and while I have written in the past on measurement issues 
relating to ITA1,
112
 a fuller analysis of quantum in ITA2 awards is a task for another day. The 
point is that, denying a right by the estate for ITA2 or ITA1 award (let alone where ITA3 in 
the form of personal injury damages is available) does not necessitate denying compensating 
for ITA 2 or 1 in general.  
Secondly, even if conceptually ITA2 is a stand-alone claim which ought to survive 
death, it might be justified not to recognize it as actionable if its purpose or effect is to 
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circumvent an existing remedial limitation.
113
 This point could be argued both ways, since, at 
times, the loss of coherence (or the legitimacy deficiency) might be more than compensated 
for by better attaining substantive justice.
114
 But it is not obviously clear that curtailing 
damages for lost years is so problematic to justify a significant award of ITA2 to overcome 
such curtailment (although the low tag price on the life of the elderly is problematic in terms 
of distributive justice, symbolically, and potentially in terms of efficiency and deterrence). Be 
it as it may, in arguing for additional £50,000 for loss of autonomy where traditional damages 
were limited to c £15,000 (or £5,500 for pain, suffering and loss of amenity) the claimant’s 
representative did the case for recognizing ITA a disservice, by conflating the questions 
whether a free standing head of damages should be recognized and the question of quantum.  
The high amount requested convinced the court that the purpose, or at least the effect of 
compensating ITA, would be to circumvent the Administration of Justice Act’s limitation, 
which the court was loath to do, and this militated against recognizing ITA2 as actionable 
damage to the estate in negligence. 
Shaw’s holding, then, should not be understood as undermining this article’s thesis 
that the five cases discussed in Part II amount to (inconsistent, partial) recognition of ITA in 
English case law. Shaw is limited either to awarding type 2 in addition to type 3 damages, or 
to awarding it to the estate. As for the broader propositions made in Shaw, the court did not 
discuss three of the five cases on which Part II’s thesis is based, it mischaracterised Chester 
as dealing only with causation, failing to appreciate the significance  of (over) compensating 
ITA in circumstances in which the personal injury was not caused by the failure to warn to 
recognizing ITA1 as actionable, and failed to distinguish cases such as Lumba, in which the 
claimant suffered no deprivation of real choice, with cases such as Tracey (and the patient in 
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Shaw) in which the claimants arguably did.
115
 The combination of absence of comprehensive 
argument and lack of engagement with the relevant literature
116
 significantly hamper the 
persuasive authority of Shaw. 
    
IV. UNDER-THEORIZATION AND INCONSISTENCIES 
As discussed in Part I, ‘autonomy’ is a contested concept. As I shall show, the five autonomy 
cases present a number of inconsistencies, along with some open questions (which in turn are 
a source of further potential inconsistencies). A major reason for this unfortunate state of 
affairs is the absence of a clear analytical and conceptual framework. This causes difficulties 
in relation to both questions of whether ITA is actionable damage and how to quantify 
damages. Recently, I have presented a conceptual framework and argued normatively that 
ITA type 2 (and, at least in the informed consent context, also type 1) ought to be considered 
as actionable in negligence.
117
 In this Part, I argue that the main building blocks of that 
conceptual framework – the distinctions between types 1, 2 and 3 ITA and meaningful 
choice, reliance interest and irreversibility as constitutive elements of a genuine ITA – will 
expose significant inconsistencies in the way ITA is protected in English negligence cases.
118
 
First, courts fail to distinguish between types 1 and 2; this failure has important ramifications 
when deciding whether to afford a remedy at all and how to quantify the loss. The use of 
‘injury to autonomy’ hides the important distinction between types 1, 2 and 3 and the 
required nuanced policy analysis of whether, and if so how, to remedy each type. Secondly, 
the quantification of the ITA in these cases is often inadequate in itself. Finally, when 
examined against each other, the cases reveal considerable inconsistencies 
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 For an analysis of how Israeli courts were plagued by similar confusions see Keren-Paz, 
‘Normative Evaluation’ (n1). Ten years later, some confusions persist while others were ameliorated. 
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A. Inversed Hierarchies (Better Protection for Type 1 ITA) 
Type 2 ITA presents a more significant autonomy encroachment than type 1. After all, in 
type 2 the claimant would not have agreed to be moved from the pre-intervention to the post-
intervention state of affairs, while so agreeing (had she been asked) in type 1. And yet, the 
case which afforded the strongest remedy of the five cases is Chester, a type 1 ITA. As a type 
1 injury, damages should be on the lower side of the spectrum since the claimant would have 
conceded to undergo the procedure with the associated risk. This means that (1) there is no 
causation between the breach of duty to disclose the risk and the physical injury and (2) the 
ITA itself is less serious than in type 2 cases, in which the choice is more significant. Yet, 
since according to the House of Lords the claimant was entitled to be compensated for her 
physical injury, that measure of damages is likely to be much higher than that received in 
Rees, a type 2 injury. Secondly, and related to this, the physical injury is the wrong measure 
for the type 1 ITA
119
 and, indeed, for type 2. Loss of autonomy consequent on physical injury 
is a type 3.
120
 In principle, a type 1 (or 2) injury exists even where the risk does not 
materialize.
121
 The fact that type 1 ITA is likely to be more significant where the patient 
suffered physical injury does not justify awarding the claimant damages for the physical 
injury. The physical injury is still not the legal result of the breach of duty, while the type 1 
ITA is. In other words, the error in Chester is the award of type 3 damages for a type 1 injury.  
The significance of this error becomes clear when Chester is compared with Rees, in 
which the House of Lords deviated from the principle of full compensation – the well-
entrenched individual assessment of damages – for a flat amount. This in itself is inconsistent 
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 Hoffman in Chester (n5) and in Leonard Hoffmann, ‘Causation’ (2005) 121 LQR 592, 601–2; 
Clark and Nolan (n5) 674–77. 
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 See Part II above. 
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 Clark and Nolan (n5) 682, 685; Keren-Paz, ‘Normative Evaluation’(n1) at 194–95; Daaka (n25) 
574–75; cf Stevens (n55) 166. 
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with Chester (and of course with the rest of English remedy law). If at all, type 1 injury is 
more amenable to a conventional award, since claimants in this category complain only of the 
fact that they were deprived of the possibility to say yes, not of being subject to an inferior 
state of affairs, where harm will naturally vary from one claimant to another. 
Leaving aside this inconsistency, one might still doubt whether the award to all 
‘unexpecting’ mothers (in wrongful conception cases) should be standardized, ignoring 
important differences between them. For example, the intrusion into the reproductive 
autonomy of someone who does not wish to be a mother at all seems, on the face of it, to be 
more significant than one who felt she had enough children. Similarly, the motivation for not 
wishing to have a child might have a bearing on the significance of the intrusion.
122
 And of 
course, individual circumstances will influence the ‘opportunity cost’ of having an unplanned 
child.
123
 A conventional award does not accommodate any of these factors.
124
 
 Rees is also conspicuous for the paltry amount given as compensation (or 
vindication).
125
 This is problematic, both in itself and in comparison to the decision in 
Chester (noted above). The injury in Rees ought to be considered at the higher end of 
violation of one’s autonomy in terms of the context (reproductive autonomy) and its long-
lasting and ever-present consequences. The idea that £15,000 is sufficient to either vindicate 
the claimant’s choice not to become a parent, or to compensate her for the profound effects of 
this intrusion on her life, is shocking indeed.  
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 For example, thwarting a financially motivated decision seems less intrusive than thwarting a 
motivation to avoid the burden of raising children. See Bevilacqua v Altenkirk [2004] BCSC 945 in 
which the different parents’ motivations led to an award of $30,000 to the mother and $20,000 to the 
father.  
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 For example, the effect of the caring responsibility on the mother’s educational and career choices 
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 For critique see eg Priaulx (n5) 73–76; Morris (n5) 16. For an understanding of the award as 
vindication see V Wilcox, ‘Vindicatory Damages: A Farewell?’ (2012) 3(3) J Eur Tort L 390, 405; J 
Varuhas, ‘The Concept of Vindication in the Law of Torts: Rights, Interests and Damages’ (2014) 24 
OJLS 253, 269–70. 
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 The inconsistency with Chester is also puzzling. Following the litigation (which was 
limited to issues of liability), Chester probably received an amount much higher than £15,000 
in circumstances where the choice had little importance (since Chester would have opted for 
the procedure if informed). Yet the same legal system gave only £15,000 for negligently 
undermining the choice the treatment was intended to advance – not to have a further child – 
in circumstances where the effect on the claimant was profound. Chester awarded type 3 
damages for a type 1 injury, ie, where the breach of duty did not cause the physical injury. In 
contrast, Rees failed to award type 3 damages (upkeep costs and forgone income in the labour 
market as a result of caring responsibilities) and, in addition, failed to give full compensation 
for ITA type 2; note that for both types 2 and 3 ITA causation of such damage existed (by 
definition).
126
 Of course, the fact that the amount awarded was inappropriate ought not lead 
to the conclusion that no award should be given. Neither is the critique of the award in Rees 
as unsatisfactory a critique per se of the flat amount method. A conventional award of a range 
of £150,000–£200,000 could have better reflected the profound undermining of such a 
fundamental aspect of one’s autonomy. Whether examined in isolation or in comparison to 
Chester, the holding in Rees is problematic for both deviating from the principle of full 
compensation and awarding a derisory amount, failing to capture the real loss suffered by the 
claimant, and by this effectively and erroneously treating the ITA as type 1.  
 
B. Treating Similar Cases Differently 
A look at the two reproductive autonomy cases reveals a quite different treatment of ITA. A 
look at the two informed consent cases suggests that they might be inconsistent, if Tracey is 
treated as a type 1 remedy to a type 1 injury.  
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 Moreover, as discussed above, if a conventional award has a place at all, it should be awarded for a 
type 1 injury (Chester), not for a type 2 injury (Rees). 
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1. Reproductive autonomy  
The defendant’s breach of duty in Yearworth obviously interfered with the reproductive 
autonomy of those claimants who did not regain their fertility. There is much to be said (on 
grounds of consistency) for the applicability of the conventional award in Rees, irrespective 
of the availability of damages in bailment for mental distress. Note that there are several 
issues here: (1) the nature of the claim in Yearworth as a standalone ITA (as opposed to type 
3 psychiatric injury); (2) whether a remedy for the ITA should accumulate with damages for 
mental distress; (3) whether a standalone remedy should be a conventional award (to be 
consistent with Rees) or adhere to the principle of full compensation (given the critique 
offered above of that conventional award); (4) how, ideally, the quantum for ITA in 
Yearworth (foregone fatherhood) should compare with that of Rees (thrusted-upon 
motherhood); and (5) whether for some claimants in Yearworth the ITA is type 1, rather than 
type 2. 
The first issue was discussed in Part II. If the protected interest is indeed reproductive 
autonomy rather than the destruction of property, it should be remedied directly as a type 2 
ITA (as it was in Rees, albeit unsatisfactorily), rather than being remedied indirectly as a type 
3.
127
 Turning to the second issue, could claimants recover for both ITA and the psychiatric 
injury or the distress? It is useful to distinguish between three groups of claimants. Firstly, 
there are claimants who did not regain fertility, who ought to recover for ITA even if they did 
not suffer psychiatric injury (or even distress, if ITA is to be measured irrespective of the 
distress it causes
128
); otherwise, the type 3 award in Yearworth is under-inclusive. Secondly, 
claimants who suffered psychiatric injury ought to be compensated for that loss, which could 
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 As the analysis of the next issue reveals, remedying mental distress for the lost property (sperm) is 
potentially under-inclusive from the perspective of reproductive autonomy.  
128
 Space constraints do not allow discussing this important point. An analogy to Gulati v MGN Ltd 
[2015] EWHC 1482; aff’d [2015] EWCA Civ 1291 (CA) might suggest a positive answer. Israeli 
courts are in disagreement. See also (in a type 1 context) Keren-Paz, ‘Normative Evaluation’  (n1) 
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be conceived as either a consequence of the ITA or of the damage to their property. The 
former alternative is to be preferred, since (as I argued above) the gist of the injury in 
Yearworth is ITA, not property damage. Thirdly, this conclusion holds true also with respect 
to claimants who suffered psychiatric injury (from the belief they would not be able to father 
children) prior to regaining fertility, who therefore did not suffer permanent ITA. The injury 
to these claimants could be regarded as consequent on either property damage or temporary 
ITA.
129
  
The third issue raises an important and general jurisprudential question on the 
relationship between coherence and justice. Both Rees- and Yearworth-like claimants should 
receive full compensation for the interference with their reproductive autonomy. To the 
extent that a standalone ITA award in Yearworth would have been set above £15,000 while 
the Rees limitation stands, I would see this as problematic  both on the basis of inconsistency 
and feminist critique. Indeed, that the actual award the claimants in Yearworth are likely to 
receive far exceeds £15,000 is problematic in terms of gender equality. This relates to the 
fourth issue that, in applying Rees (and setting aside the questions of whether a conventional 
award and the amount given by the court are appropriate) one needs to decide whether 
interference with reproductive autonomy by preventing the claimant from becoming a parent 
is more, less or as serious as an interference making the claimant an unwanted parent. One 
also needs to decide whether these harms are gendered, and if so, whether this ought to be 
reflected in the size of the award.
130
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 Remedying temporary ITA is consistent with the requirement (Keren-Paz, ‘Conceptual Analysis’ 
(n1) 424) that the loss of autonomy be irreversible.
 
 When the psychiatric injury is suffered, the loss of 
autonomy – the loss of the option to father a child – has occurred. In any event, for those who 
regained fertility, the consequent psychiatric injury can outlast the period of infertility, and is in this 
sense irreversible. Both personal injury and loss of autonomy could be suffered in varying duration. 
While the fact that the injury was temporal is and ought to be taken into account as a matter of 
quantum, a permanent injury is not a condition for a remedial response.  
130
 These questions have to be answered, even if the decisions in Rees and Yearworth are corrected, so 
that all types of interference with reproductive autonomy would be remedied according to the 
principle of full compensation. 
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I turn now to the fifth and last issue. Understanding Yearworth as based on 
interference with reproductive autonomy also casts doubt on the conclusion of the trial judge 
(not litigated on appeal) that the claimants were not entitled to damages for personal injury, 
other than in respect of any psychological injuries, unless there was more than an even 
chance that a child would have been conceived by use of the lost sperm.
131
 Once the issue is 
framed as a matter of ITA, it should not be necessary to show on a balance of probabilities 
that the claimant would have had a child from the sperm but for the breach of duty. Rather, 
what matters is that any claimant who did not regain fertility lost a valuable choice whether 
to become a father. Losing this choice – the option to become a parent – is in itself an inferior 
state of affairs requiring a remedy. Options in the commercial context have a clear economic 
value. The option whether or not to become a parent is also valuable (although mainly from a 
non-economic perspective).
132
 Plausibly, the quantum ought to be higher for a claimant who 
can show on a balance of probabilities that he would have fathered a child, but as a matter of 
entitlement, ‘more than an even chance’ ought not be considered a constitutive element of the 
claim.
133
 Alternatively (but less appealing in my opinion), those who on the balance of 
probabilities would not have conceived a child could sue for a type 1 injury – since they were 
deprived of the option to become a father, even though they would not have used that option.  
 In both Rees and Yearworth reproductive autonomy was protected, but only to an 
extent. Like Chester, it seems that the claimants’ autonomy interest was the driver behind the 
court’s willingness in Yearworth to afford claimants a remedy, but that the measure of 
recovery was based on an injury to another interest: personal injury in Chester and mental 
distress (or psychiatric injury) in Yearworth. Rees is the strongest authority for directly 
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compensating the claimant for undermining her autonomy. Yearworth is more equivocal: on 
the one hand, it pins damages on mental distress, not on the ITA per se.
134
 On the other hand, 
it affords compensation to those who eventually did not lose (at least not permanently) a 
valuable choice – those who suffered mental distress (or psychiatric injury) from the fear they 
had lost their chance to father a child, but then regained fertility. Neither Rees not Yearworth 
stands for the proposition that a claimant can obtain full compensation for the interference 
itself with their reproductive autonomy. 
 
2. Informed consent 
Since the court in Tracey did not substantively discuss the common law cause of action, it is 
difficult to make any observation about possible inconsistency with other cases. If Ms Tracey 
could have sued in negligence for the failure to inform her of her DNAR status, her damage 
could be one of the following (or both): either interference with her autonomy (or dignity) by 
failing to involve her in the process regardless of the fact that the decision would not have 
changed (ITA type 1); or her premature death due to the DNAR (personal injury, so ITA type 
3). The logic of Chester (problematic as it is) might lead us to think that the latter should be 
allowed: if vindicating autonomy justified liability for personal injury, despite the fact that 
the breach did not increase the risk of its occurrence, why ought it not impose liability for the 
premature death even though the breach of duty did not increase that risk? After all, death is 
the ultimate loss of autonomy, so whatever the policy considerations justifying the majority 
decision in Chester, surely they apply to a greater extent in Tracey? 
 Those convinced that the decision in Chester is correct can still attempt to distinguish 
it. The most obvious reason is but-for causation: similar to the claimants in Yearworth who 
regained fertility, the ITA loss suffered by Ms Tracey was temporary, since the DNAR status 
                                                     
134
 In practice the former compensates for the latter, but does it do so adequately? 
36 
 
was reinstated after consultation with the patient and her family and before death. But this 
still leaves us with the question of whether wrongful death damages could have been awarded 
had Ms Tracey died before agreeing to the DNAR status and under the assumption that either 
she would have agreed to this status had she been informed, or that it would be lawful to 
retain her DNAR status despite her objection. Possibly, still, Chester could be distinguished. 
According to the perceived wisdom (which I doubt
135
), but-for causation existed in Chester, 
since the chances of the risk materializing in any single procedure were (considerably) below 
the balance of probabilities.
136
 In contrast, both the chances that the event necessitating 
resuscitation would occur, and that DNAR would be ineffective (so death would follow even 
if resuscitation were attempted) seem to be more probable than not.
137
 Alternatively, one 
might view Ms Tracey as less deserving of a remedy, since the breach did not affect her 
autonomy in the sense that she was ultimately subject to the clinical opinion not to 
resuscitate, as opposed to Chester, who had the right to refuse treatment.
138
  
 Assuming Tracey supports remedying the ITA type 1 itself, rather than the personal 
injury, it is a step in the right direction, despite the fact that, as explained above, it is arguably 
inconsistent with the award in Chester. 
 
C. Conclusion 
As the discussion has revealed, Chester, Rees and Yearworth are problematic both 
when looked upon in isolation and compared to each other. The protection afforded to ITA in 
these cases is patchy, inconsistent and under-theorized; the problems are both across 
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categories of case law (mainly Chester and Rees) and within (mainly Rees and Yearworth). 
Most troubling perhaps is the award of type 3 (hefty) damages for type 1 ITA in Chester, 
while at the same time awarding de facto type 1 damages for very significant types 2 and 3 
ITA in Rees.
139
 It is perhaps ironic that the two decisions – Bhamra and Tracey – in which 
the protection of types 2 and 1 autonomy in negligence was made in passing and as an obiter 
(and incidentally by a lower court than the decisions in Chester and Rees) are the soundest. If 
we take the decision in Bhamra at face value, remedying the injury to the guests’ autonomy 
would pose none of the problems exposed in Rees and Chester (and to a lesser extent in 
Yearworth). The award would be based on the principle of full compensation, and not on the 
anomaly of a conventional award. It would compensate the claimants for the relevant and 
much lower (in Bhamra, not in Rees) type 2 loss (or for Chester, type 1 loss) rather than 
basing the award, as in Chester, on the physical injury, which is a type 3 loss not caused by 
the breach of duty. Nor would it be necessarily limited to compensating the claimants for 
their mental distress (or psychiatric illness) from the breach, as was the case in Yearworth. 
The approach in Bhamra has the potential for calibrating an award that is based on the 
relevant factors: a type 2 injury that relates to an important ethical or religious tenet, which 
has a bearing on both bodily integrity (what we eat) and freedom of conscience (which 
ethical rules we follow), which, unlike Chester, brought the claimant to an inferior state of 
affairs but which, unlike Rees, was limited in terms of duration and effect. If the obiter in 
Tracey refers (as it seems) to the ITA type 1, rather than to the personal injury, the same 
could also be said of Tracey.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
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 This illustrates the shortcomings involved in the absence of joined-up thinking about the damage 
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ITA is a standalone actionable damage in negligence where the claimant is deprived 
of a meaningful choice, there is no setback to another recognized interest and either the 
claimant is brought to a subjectively inferior state of affairs (type 2) or was deprived of the 
opportunity to agree to be moved to that state of affairs (type 1). English law recognizes such 
damage as actionable in a series of cases, some of which – Bhamra, Tracey and Yearworth – 
were not hitherto understood to do so. Shaw should be understood as denying actionability of 
ITA2 only where ITA3 award is available, or to the estate; the court’s failure to address 
Yearworth, Bhamra and especially Tracey significantly undermines Shaw’s persuasive 
authority.  However, the under-theorization in the cases leads to inconsistencies. Like cases 
(Rees/Yearworth; Chester/Tracey) are not treated alike; ITA is misunderstood to be about 
‘religious offence’ (Bhamra) and property loss (Yearworth) and worse still, the more serious 
type 2 ITA (Rees) gives rise to a weaker remedy (of exceptional nature aside) than the less 
serious type 1 injury (Chester). A better understanding of the different manifestations of ITA 
will lead to results which are consistent and more justified on the merit.   
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